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Abstract—A tunable measure for information leakage called
maximal α-leakage is introduced. This measure quantifies the
maximal gain of an adversary in refining a tilted version of its
prior belief of any (potentially random) function of a dataset
conditioning on a disclosed dataset. The choice of α determines
the specific adversarial action ranging from refining a belief for
α = 1 to guessing the best posterior for α = ∞, and for these
extremal values this measure simplifies to mutual information
(MI) and maximal leakage (MaxL), respectively. For all other
α this measure is shown to be the Arimoto channel capacity.
Several properties of this measure are proven including: (i) quasi-
convexity in the mapping between the original and disclosed
datasets; (ii) data processing inequalities; and (iii) a composition
property.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information leakage metrics seek to quantify an adver-
sary’s ability of inferring information about one quantity from
another. Mutual information (MI) is a classic measure for
quantifying information and often used to measure information
secrecy [1] or leakage in data publishing settings [2], [3].
More recently, Issa et al. introduced a measure, called maximal
leakage (MaxL), for a guessing adversary that quantifies the
maximal multiplicative gain of an adversary, with access to a
disclosed dataset, to guess any (possible random) function of
the original dataset [4].
Information leakage measures can be viewed through the
lens of adversarial inference capabilities, and therefore, quan-
tified via a loss function that the adversary seeks to minimize.
The choice of a loss function provides a concrete measure of
the gain in adversarial inference capability. For example, the
definition of MaxL can be interpreted in terms of an adversary
seeking to minimize the 0-1 loss function, which induces the
adversary towards a hard decision, i.e., a maximum likelihood
estimator. On the other hand, when MI is used as a leakage
measure, the underlying loss function is the logarithmic loss
(log-loss) function [5]–[7], which models a (soft decision)
belief-refining adversary. These two models capture two ex-
tremal actions of adversaries. Can these measures be viewed
through the same framework? In this paper, we introduce a
tunable measure, called maximal α-leakage, for information
leakages, which encompasses MI (for α = 1) and MaxL (for
α = ∞) and allows continuous interpolation between the
two extremes. The parameter α can be viewed as a tunable
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parameter that determines how much weight the adversary
gives to its posterior belief.
In this paper, we define two tunable measures for infor-
mation leakages in Section III: α-leakage (Definition 4) and
maximal α-leakage (Definition 5). In Section III, we prove that
the α-leakage can be expressed as Arimoto mutual information
(A-MI) (Theorem 1), and the maximal α-leakage is equivalent
to the supremum of A-MI and Sibson mutual information (S-
MI) (Theorem 2) over all distributions of the original dataset.
In Section IV, we prove several important properties of the
maximal α-leakage.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We begin by reviewing Re´nyi entropy and divergence [8].
Definition 1. Given a discrete distribution PX over a finite
alphabet X , the Re´nyi entropy of order α ∈ (0, 1)∪ (1,∞) is
defined as
Hα(PX) =
α
1− α
log ‖PX‖α. (1)
Let QX be a discrete distribution over X . The Re´nyi diver-
gence (between PX and QX ) of order α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) is
defined as
Dα(PX‖QX) =
1
α− 1
log
(∑
x
PX(x)
α
QX(x)α−1
)
. (2)
Both of the two quantities are defined by their continuous
extension for α = 1 or ∞.
The α-leakage and max α-leakage metrics can be expressed
in terms of Sibson mutual information (S-MI) [9] and Arimoto
mutual information (A-MI) [10]. These quantities generalize
the usual notion of MI. We review these definitions next.
Definition 2. Let discrete random variables (X,Y ) ∼ PXY
with PX and PY as the marginal distributions, respectively,
andQY be an arbitrary marginal distribution of Y . The Sibson
mutual information (S-MI) of order α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) is
defined as
ISα(X ;Y ) , inf
QY
Dα(PXY ‖PX ×QY ),
=
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX(x)PY |X(y|x)
α
) 1
α
(3)
(4)
The Arimoto mutual information (A-MI) of order α ∈ (0, 1)∪
(1,∞) is defined as
IAα(X ;Y ) , Hα(X)−Hα(X |Y )
=
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX (x)
αPY |X (y|x)
α
∑
x
PX(x)α
) 1
α
,
(5)
(6)
where Hα(X |Y ) is Arimoto conditional entropy of X given
Y defined as
Hα(X |Y ) =
α
1− α
log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX(x)
αPY |X (y|x)
α
) 1
α
. (7)
All of these quantities are defined by their continuous extension
for α = 1 or ∞.
III. INFORMATION LEAKAGE MEASURES
In this section, we formally define the tunable leakage
measures: α-leakage and maximal α-leakage.
Let X , Y and U be three discrete random variables with
finite supportsX , Y and U , respectively. Let Xˆ be an estimator
of X and P
Xˆ|Y indicate a strategy for estimating X given Y .
We denote the probability of correctly estimatingX = x given
Y = y as
Pc(PXˆ|Y , x, y) = PXˆ|Y (x|y) = P(Xˆ = x|x, y). (8)
Let X and Y represent the original data and disclosed data,
respectively, and let U represent an arbitrary (potentially ran-
dom) function of X that the adversary (a curious or malicious
user of the disclosed data Y ) is interested in learning. In [11],
Issa et al. introduced MaxL to qualify the maximal gain in an
adversary’s ability of guessing U by knowing Y . We review
the definition below.
Definition 3 ( [11, Def. 1]). Given a joint distribution PXY ,
the maximal leakage from X to Y is
LMaxL(X → Y ) , sup
U−X−Y
log
max
u
E
[
P(Uˆ = u|Y )
]
max
u
P(U˜ = u)
. (9)
where both estimators Uˆ and U˜ take values from the same
arbitrary finite support as U .
Remark 1. Note that from (8), the numerator of the logarith-
mic term in (9) can be explicitly written as
max
u
E
[
P(Uˆ = u|Y )
]
= max
u
∑
y
PY (y)PUˆ |Y (u|y). (10)
In Definition 3, U represents any (possibly random) function
of X . The numerator represents the maximal probability of
correctly guessing U based on Y , while the denominator
represents the maximal probability of correctly guessing U
without knowing Y . Thus, MaxL quantifies the maximal gain
(in bits) in guessing any possible function of X when an
adversary has access to Y .
We now present α-leakage and maximal α-leakage (under
the assumptions of discrete random variables and finite sup-
ports). The α-leakage measures various aspects of the leakage
(ranging from the probability of correctly guessing to the
posteriori distribution) about data X from the disclosed Y .
Definition 4 (α-Leakage). Given a joint distribution PXY and
an estimator Xˆ with the same support as X , the α-leakage
from X to Y is defined as
Lα(X→Y ) ,
α
α−1 log
max
P
Xˆ|Y
E
[
P(Xˆ=X|X,Y )
α−1
α
]
max
P
Xˆ
E
[
P(Xˆ=X|X)
α−1
α
] (11)
for α ∈ (1,∞) and by the continuous extension of (11) for
α = 1 and ∞.
From (8), the numerator of the logarithmic term in (11) can
be explicitly written as
max
P
Xˆ|Y
E
[
P(Xˆ = X |X,Y )
α−1
α
]
=max
P
Xˆ|Y
∑
xy
PXY (xy)PXˆ|Y (x|y)
α−1
α . (12)
Analogous to the analysis for MaxL in Remark 1, α-leakage
quantifies the multiplicative increase in the expected reward
for correctly inferring X when an adversary has access to Y .
Whereas α-leakage captures how much an adversary can
learn about X from Y , we also wish to quantify the informa-
tion leaked about any function of X through Y . To this end,
we define maximal α-leakage below.
Definition 5 (Maximal α-Leakage). Given a joint distribution
PXY on finite alphabets X ×Y , the maximal α-leakage from
X to Y is defined as
Lmaxα (X → Y ) , sup
U−X−Y
Lα(U → Y ) (13)
where α ∈ [1,∞], U represents any function of X and takes
values from an arbitrary finite alphabet.
Remark 2. Note that the optimal P ∗
Xˆ
of the maximization in
the denominator of the logarithmic term in (11) minimizes the
expectation of the following loss function
ℓ(x, P
Xˆ
) =
α
α− 1
(
1− P
Xˆ
(x)1−
1
α
)
, (14)
for each α ∈ (1,∞). The limit of the loss function in (14)
leads to the log-loss (for α = 1) and 0-1 loss (for α = ∞)
functions, respectively. In addition, for α = 1 and ∞, the
maximal α-leakage simplifies to MI and MaxL, respectively.
These comments are formalized in the following theorems.
The following theorem simplifies the expression of the α-
leakage in (11) by solving the two maximizations in the
logarithmic term.
Theorem 1. For α ∈ [1,∞], α-leakage defined in (11)
simplifies to
Lα(X → Y ) = I
A
α(X ;Y ) α ∈ [1,∞]. (15)
The proof hinges on solving the optimal estimations P ∗
Xˆ|Y
and P ∗
Xˆ
in (11) for knowing Y or not, respectively, as
P ∗
Xˆ|Y
(x|y) =
PX|Y (x|y)
α∑
x PX|Y (x|y)
α
(x, y) ∈ X × Y
P ∗
Xˆ
(x) =
PX(x)
α∑
x PX(x)
α
x ∈ X ,
(16a)
(16b)
and therefore, the logarithm of the ratio in (11) simplifies to
A-MI. A detailed proof is in Appendix A. Making use of
the conclusion in Theorem 1, the following theorem gives
equivalent expressions for the maximal α-leakage.
Theorem 2. For α ∈ [1,∞], the maximal α-leakage defined
in (13) simplifies to
Lmaxα (X → Y )
=


sup
PX˜
ISα(X˜;Y ) = sup
PX˜
IAα(X˜ ;Y ) α ∈ (1,∞]
I(X ;Y ) α = 1
(17a)
(17b)
where PX˜ has the same support as PX .
Note that the maximal α-leakage is essentially the Arimoto
channel capacity (with a support-set constrained input distribu-
tion) for α ≥ 1 [10]. This theorem is proved by first applying
Theorem 1 to write the maximal α-leakage as
Lmaxα (X → Y ) = sup
U−X−Y
IAα (U ;Y ) α ∈ [1,∞]. (18)
Subsequently, using the facts that A-MI and S-MI have
the same supremum [12, Thm. 5] and that S-MI satisfies
data processing inequality [12, Thm. 3], we upper bound
the supremum of (18) by supPX˜ I
S
α(X˜ ;Y ), and then, show
that the upper bound can be achieved by a specific U with
H(X |U) = 0. A detailed proof can be found in Appendix B.
IV. PROPERTIES OF MAXIMAL α-LEAKAGE
In this section, we will prove that maximal α-leakage
has several properties that one would expect any reasonable
leakage measure to have, including: (i) quasi-convexity in the
conditional distribution PY |X ; (ii) data processing inequalities;
and (iii) a composition property.
These properties are proved in the following theorem, which
makes use of the equivalent form of maximal alpha-leakage
found in Theorem 2, as well as known properties of S-MI
from [9], [12], [13].
Theorem 3. For α ∈ [1,∞], maximal α-leakage
1. is quasi-convex in PY |X ;
2. is monotonically non-decreasing in α;
3. satisfies data processing inequalities: let random vari-
ables X,Y, Z form a Markov chain, i.e., X − Y − Z ,
then
Lmaxα (X → Z) ≤ L
max
α (X → Y )
Lmaxα (X → Z) ≤ L
max
α (Y → Z).
(19a)
(19b)
4. satisfies
Lmaxα (X → Y ) ≥ 0 (20)
with equality if and only if X is independent of Y , and
Lmaxα (X → Y ) ≤
{
log |X | α > 1
H(PX) α = 1
(21)
with equality if X is a deterministic function of Y .
5. Lmaxα (X→ Y ) ≤ I
S
∞(PX , PY |X) with equality if PY |X
has either 0 or the maximal leakage in Part 4;
6. Lmaxα (X→Y ) ≥ I
S
α
(
P
(u)
X , PY |X
)
, where P
(u)
X indicates
the uniform distribution of X , i.e.,
Lmaxα (X → Y ) ≥
α
α−1 log
∑
y∈Y
( ∑
x∈X
PY |X(y|x)
α
) 1
α
|X |
1
α
. (22)
The equality holds if either PY |X is symmetric
1 or PY |X
has 0 leakage.
A detailed proof is in Appendix C.
Remark 3. Note that both MI and MaxL are convex in PY |X
so that Lmax1 (X → Y ) and L
max
∞ (X → Y ) are convex in PY |X .
Consider two disclosed versions Y1 and Y2 of X . The
following theorem upper bounds the maximal α-leakage to an
adversary who has access to both Y1 and Y2 simultaneously.
Theorem 4 (Composition Theorem). Given a Markov chain
Y1 −X − Y2, we have (α ∈ [1,∞])
Lmaxα (X → Y1, Y2) ≤
∑
i∈{1,2}
Lmaxα (X → Yi). (23)
This composition theorem allows composing multiple re-
leases under a total leakage constraint. A detailed proof is in
Appendix D.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Via α- and maximal α-leakage, we have introduced novel
tunable measures for information leakage. These measures can
find direct applications in privacy and secrecy problems. The
choice of restricting either specific variables or all possible
functions of a dataset determines the choice of α- and max-
imal α-leakage measures, respectively. Future work includes
characterizing privacy-utility tradeoffs for these measures and
evaluating existing privacy mappings against these metrics.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The expression (11) can be explicitly written as
Lα(X → Y ) = lim
α′→α
α′
α′ − 1
log


max
P
Xˆ|Y
∑
xy
PXY (xy)
(
P
Xˆ|Y (x|y)
)α′−1
α′
max
P
Xˆ
∑
x
PX(x)PXˆ(x)
α′−1
α′

 . (24)
To simplify the expression in (24), we need to solve the two
maximizations in the logarithm. First, we concentrate on the
1All rows of PY |X are permutations of other rows, and so are columns.
maximization in the denominator of the logarithm in (24)
and the one in the numerator can be solved following the
same analysis. The maximization in the denominator can be
equivalently written as
max
P
Xˆ
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PXˆ(x)
1− 1
α′
s.t.
∑
x∈X
P
Xˆ
(x) = 1
P
Xˆ
(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X
(25a)
(25b)
(25c)
For α′ ∈ [1,∞), the problem in (25) is a convex program.
Therefore, by using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions,
we obtain the optimal value of (25) as
max
P
Xˆ
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PXˆ (x)
α′−1
α′ =
(∑
x∈X
PX(x)
α′
) 1
α′
, (26)
with the optimal solution P ∗
Xˆ
as
P ∗
Xˆ
(x) =
PX(x)
α′∑
x∈X
PX(x)α
′ for all x ∈ X (27)
Similarly, we attain the optimal solution P ∗
Xˆ|Y
of the maxi-
mization in the numerator of the logarithm in (24) as
P ∗
Xˆ|Y
(x|y) =
PX|Y (x|y)
α′∑
x∈X
PX|Y (x|y)α
′ (28)
for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , and therefore, we have
max
P
Xˆ|Y
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
PXY (xy)PXˆ|Y (x|y)
α′−1
α′
=
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)
(∑
x∈X
PX|Y (x|y)
α′
) 1
α′
. (29)
Thus, for α ∈ [1,∞), we have
Lα(X → Y ) =
lim
α′→α
α′
α′ − 1
log


∑
y
PY (y)
(∑
x
PX|Y (x|y)
α′
) 1
α′
(∑
x
PX(x)α
′
) 1
α′

 , (30)
i.e., A-MI of order α ∈ [1,∞) in (6).
Note that if α =∞, the optimal solution in (27) is 00 . We go
back to the expression in (11) and observe that if α =∞, the
expression L∞(X → Y ) becomes
L∞(X → Y )
= log

maxPXˆ|Y
∑
x,y
PXY (xy)PXˆ|Y (x|y)
max
P
Xˆ
∑
x
PX(x)PXˆ (x)

 . (31)
Since the largest convex combinations is the maximal involved
value, the optimal values of the two maximizations in (31) are
max
P
Xˆ|Y
∑
xy
PXY (xy)PXˆ|Y (x|y)
=
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PX|Y (x|y)
max
P
Xˆ
∑
x
PX(x)PXˆ(x) = maxx
PX(x).
(32a)
(32b)
Therefore, for α =∞, we have
L∞(X → Y ) = log


∑
y∈Y
PY (y)max
x
PX|Y (x|y)
max
x
PX(x)

 , (33)
which is exactly the A-MI of order ∞. Therefore, α-leakage
can be equivalently expressed as IAα (X ;Y ) for α ∈ [1,∞].
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
From Theorem 1, we have for α ∈ [1,∞],
Lmaxα (X → Y ) = sup
U−X−Y
IAα (U ;Y ). (34)
If α = 1, we have
Lmax1 (X → Y ) = sup
U−X−Y
I(U ;Y ) ≤ I(X ;Y ) (35)
where the inequality is from data processing inequalities of
MI [14, Thm 2.8.1].
If α =∞, we have
Lmax∞ (X → Y ) = sup
U−X−Y
log
∑
y
PY (y)max
u
PU|Y (u|y)
max
u
PU (u)
, (36)
which is exactly the expression of MaxL, and therefore, we
have [11, Thm. 1]
Lmax∞ (X → Y ) = log
∑
y
max
x
PY |X(y|x). (37)
For α ∈ (1,∞), we provide an upper bound for Lmaxα (X →
Y ), and then, give an achievable scheme as follows.
Upper Bound: We have an upper bound of Lmaxα (X → Y ) as
Lmaxα (X → Y )
= sup
U−X−Y
IAα (U ;Y )
≤ sup
PX˜|U˜ :PX˜|U˜ (·|u)≪PX
sup
PU˜
IAα (U˜ ;Y )
= sup
PX˜|U˜ :PX˜|U˜ (·|u)≪PX
sup
PU˜
ISα(U˜ ;Y )
= sup
PX˜≪PX
ISα(X˜ ;Y )
= sup
PX˜≪PX
IAα (X˜;Y )
(38a)
(38b)
(38c)
(38d)
(38e)
where PX˜ ≪ PX means the alphabet of PX˜ is a subset of that
of PX . The inequality in (38b) holds because the supremum
of A-MI over all PU˜ ,X˜ on U × X is no less than that (in
(38a)) over these PU,X constrained by the PX . The equations
in (38c) and (38e) result from that A-MI and S-MI of order
α > 0 have the same supremum [12, Thm. 5]; and (38d) obeys
the data processing inequalities [12, Thm. 3].
Lower bound: We lower bound (34) by consider a random
variable U such that U − X − Y is a Markov chain and
H(X |U) = 0. Specifically, let the alphabet U consist of Ux, a
collection of U mapped to a x ∈ X , i.e., U = ∪x∈XUx with
U = u ∈ Ux if and only if X = x. Therefore, for the specific
variable U , we have
PY |U (y|u) =
{
PY |X(y|x) for all u ∈ Ux
0 otherwise.
(39)
Construct a probability distribution PX˜ over X from PU as
PX˜(x) =
∑
u∈Ux
PαU (u)∑
x∈X
∑
u∈Ux
PαU (u)
for all x ∈ X . (40)
Thus,
IAα (U ;Y )
=
α
α− 1
log
∑
y∈Y
( ∑
x∈X
∑
u∈Ux
PY |U (y|u)
αPU (u)
α
) 1
α
( ∑
x∈X
∑
u∈Ux
PU (u)α
) 1
α
=
α
α− 1
log
∑
y∈Y
( ∑
x∈X
PY |X(y|x)
α
∑
u∈Ux
PU (u)
α
) 1
α
( ∑
x∈X
∑
u∈Ux
PU (u)α
) 1
α
=
α
α− 1
log

∑
y∈Y
(∑
x∈X
PY |X(y|x)
αPX˜(x)
α
) 1
α


=ISα(X˜;Y )
Therefore,
Lmaxα (X → Y ) = sup
U−X−Y
IAα (U ;Y )
≥ sup
U :U−X−Y,H(X|U)=0
IAα (U ;Y )
= sup
PX˜≪PX
ISα(X˜;Y ),
(41a)
(41b)
where (41b) is because for any PX˜ ≪ PX , it can be obtained
through (40) by appropriately choosing PU . Therefore, com-
bining (38) and (41), we obtain (17a).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The proof of part 1: We know that for α ≥ 1, ISα(X ;Y ) is
quasi-convex PY |X for given PX [14, Thm. 2.7.4], [13, Thm.
10]. In addition, the supreme of a set of quasi-convex functions
is also quasi-convex, i.e., let function f(a, b) is quasi-convex
in b, such that supa f(a, b) is also quasi-convex in b [15].
Therefore, the maximal α-leakage in (17) is quasi-convex
PY |X for given PX .
The proof of part 2: Let β > α ≥ 1, and P ∗Xα =
arg supPX I
S
α(PX , PY |X) for given PY |X , such that
Lmaxα (X → Y ) = I
S
α(P
∗
Xα, PY |X)
≤ ISβ(P
∗
Xα, PY |X)
≤ sup
PX
ISβ(PX , PY |X)
= Lmaxβ (X → Y )
(42a)
(42b)
(42c)
(42d)
where (42b) results from that ISα is non-decreasing in α for
α > 0 [13, Thm. 4], and the equality in (42c) holds if and
only if P ∗Xα = arg supPX Iβ(PX , PY |X).
The proof of part 3: Let random variables X , Y and Z form
the Markov chain X − Y − Z . Making use of that S-MI of
order α > 1 satisfies data processing inequalities [12, Thm.
3], i.e.,
ISα(X ;Z) ≤ I
S
α(X ;Y )
ISα(X ;Z) ≤ I
S
α(Y ;Z),
(43a)
(43b)
we prove that maximal α-leakage satisfies data processing
inequalities as follows.
We first prove (19a). Let P ∗X = arg supPX I
S
α(PX , PZ|X). For
the Markov chain X − Y − Z , we have
Lmaxα (X → Z) = I
S
α(P
∗
X , PZ|X)
≤ ISα(P
∗
X , PY |X)
≤ sup
PX
ISα(PX , PY |X)
= Lmaxα (X → Y )
(44a)
(44b)
(44c)
(44d)
where the inequality in (44b) results from (43a). Similarly, the
inequality in (19b) can be proved directly from (43b).
The proof of part 4: For α ∈ (1,∞], referring to (4) and
(17a) we have
Lmaxα (X → Y )
= sup
PX
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX(x)PY |X(y|x)
α
) 1
α
≥ sup
PX
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX(x)PY |X(y|x)
)α
α
=sup
PX
α
α− 1
log 1 = 0,
(45a)
(45b)
(45c)
where (45b) results from applying Jensens inequality to the
convex function f : t → tα (t ≥ 0), such that the equality
holds if and only if given any y ∈ Y , PY |X(y|x) are the same
for all x ∈ X , such that
PY |X(y|x) = PY (y) x ∈ X , y ∈ Y (46)
which means X and Y are independent, i.e., PY |X is a rank-1
row stochastic matrix. For α = 1, we have
Lmax1 (X → Y ) = I(X ;Y ) ≥ 0, (47)
with equalities if and only if X is independent of Y [14].
Let PX⇐Y be an conditional probability matrix with only one
non-zero entry in each column, and indicate the only non-zero
entries by xy , i.e., xy = argx PX⇐Y (y|x) > 0 for all y ∈ Y .
For α =∞, we have
Lmax∞ (PX⇐Y ) = log
∑
y∈Y
PX⇐Y (y|xy) = log |X |, (48)
which is exactly the upper bound of MaxL [16, Lem. 1] and
absolutely an upper bound of maximal α leakage due to its
monotonicity in α.
For α ∈ (1,∞), from (4) and (17a) we have
Lmaxα (PX⇐Y )
= sup
PX
α
α− 1
log
∑
y∈Y
(
P
1
α
X (xy)PX⇐Y (y|xy)
)
=sup
PX
α
α− 1
log
∑
x∈X
P
1
α
X (x);
(49a)
(49b)
in addition, since the function maximized in (49b) is sym-
metric and concave in PX , it is Schur-concave in PX , and
therefore, the optimal distribution of X achieving the supreme
in (49b) is uniform. Thus,
Lmaxα (PX⇐Y ) = log |X | for α ∈ (1,∞). (50)
For α = 1, referring to (17b) we have
Lmax1 (X → Y )
=
∑
y∈Y
PX(xy)PX⇐Y (y|xy) log
PX⇐Y (y|xy)
PX(xy)PX⇐Y (y|xy)
=
∑
y∈Y
PX(xy)PX⇐Y (y|xy) log
1
PX(xy)
=
∑
x∈X
PX(x) log
1
PX(x)
= H(PX),
(51a)
(51b)
(51c)
which is exactly the upper bound of I(X ;Y ).
Therefore, if X is a deterministic function of Y , maximal α-
leakage achieves its maximal value log |X | for α > 1, and
H(PX) for α = 1.
The proof of part 5: The upper bound is directly from the fact
that maximal α-leakage is non-decreasing in α. In addition,
from the results in part 4, we know that if PY |X has 0 or the
maximal leakage in in part 4, the upper bound is tight.
The proof of part 6: Given PY |X , the lower bound is actually
the S-MI of order α for the uniform distribution of X . Due
to the concavity of ISα(PX , PY |X) (α ≥ 1) in PX [13, Thm.
8] 2, we know that ISα(PX , PY |X) is Schur concave in PX
for any symmetric PY |X . Therefore the uniform distribution
of X maximizes (17a) and its S-MI is exactly the maximal α-
2The concavity of ISα(PX , PY |X) is based on the fact that a conditional
Re´nyi divergence is concave in PX [13].
leakage [13, Col. 9]3. The PY |X in part 4 with zero leakage
make the lower bound tight.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Let Y1 and Y2 be the alphabets of Y1 and Y2, respectively. For
any (y1, y2) ∈ Y1×Y2, due to the Markov chain Y1−X−Y2,
the corresponding entry of the conditional probability matrix
of (Y1, Y2) given X is
P (y1, y2|x) = P (y1|x)P (y2|x, y1) = P (y1|x)P (y2|x). (52)
Therefore, for α ∈ (1,∞)
Lmaxα (X → Y1, Y2)
= sup
PX
α
α− 1
log
∑
y1,y2∈Y1×Y2(∑
x∈X
PX(x)PY1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x)
α
) 1
α
=sup
PX
α
α− 1
log
∑
y1,y2∈Y1×Y2(∑
x∈X
PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)
αPY2|X(y2|x)
α
) 1
α
.
(53a)
(53b)
Let K(y1) =
∑
x∈X PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)
α, for all y1 ∈ Y1,
such that we can construct a set of distributions over X as
PX˜(x|y1) =
PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)
α
K(y1)
. (54)
Therefore, from (53b), Lmaxα (X → Y1, Y2) can be rewritten as
Lmaxα (X → Y1, Y2)
= sup
PX
α
α− 1
log
∑
y1,y2∈Y1×Y2
(∑
x∈X
K(y1)PX˜(x|y1)
PY2|X(y2|x)
α
) 1
α
=sup
PX
α
α− 1
log
∑
y1,y2∈Y1×Y2
(∑
x∈X
PX(x)
PY1|X(y1|x)
α
) 1
α
(∑
x∈X
PX˜(x|y1)PY2|X(y2|x)
α
) 1
α
=sup
PX
α
α− 1
log
∑
y1∈Y1
(∑
x∈X
PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)
α
) 1
α
∑
y2∈Y2
(∑
x∈X
PX˜(x|y1)PY2|X(y2|x)
α
) 1
α
(55)
(56)
(57)
3Let f(x) be a function which is Schur concave in a vector variable x ∈
R
n, x1 and x2 be two decreasing-ordered vectors in the domain of f(x).
If x1 majors x2, i.e.,
∑
k
1
x1i ≥
∑
k
1
x2i (for all k ≤ n) and
∑
n
1
x1i =∑
n
1
x2i, then f(x1) ≤ f(x2).
≤sup
PX
α
α−1 log
( ∑
y1∈Y1
( ∑
x∈X
PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)
α
) 1
α
max
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
( ∑
x∈X
PX˜(x|y1)PY2|X(y2|x)
α
) 1
α
)
=sup
PX
α
α−1 log
( ∑
y1∈Y1
( ∑
x∈X
PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)
α
) 1
α
∑
y2∈Y2
( ∑
x∈X
PX˜(x|y
∗
1)PY2|X(y2|x)
α
) 1
α
)
≤sup
PX
α
α−1 log
( ∑
y1∈Y1
( ∑
x∈X
PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)
α
) 1
α
+sup
PX˜
α
α−1 log
∑
y2∈Y2
( ∑
x∈X
PX˜(x)PY2|X(y2|x)
α
) 1
α
=Lmaxα (X → Y1) + L
max
α (X → Y2).
(58)
(59)
(60)
(61)
where y∗1 in (59) is the optimal y1 achieving the maximum in
(58). Therefore, the equality in (58) holds if and only if, for
all y1 ∈ Y1,
∑
y2∈Y2
(∑
x∈X
PX˜(x|y1)PY2|X(y2|x)
α
) 1
α
=
∑
y2∈Y2
(∑
x∈X
PX˜(x|y
∗
1)PY2|X(y2|x)
α
) 1
α
; (62)
and the equality in (60) holds if and only if the optimal
solutions P ∗X and P
∗
X˜
of the two maximizations in (60) satisfy,
for all x ∈ X ,
P ∗
X˜
(x) =
P ∗X(x)P
α
Y1|X
(y∗1 |x)∑
x∈X PX(x)P
α
Y1|X
(y∗1 |x)
. (63)
Now we consider α = 1. For Y1 −X − Y2, we have
I(Y2;X |Y1) ≤ I(Y2;X). (64)
From Theorem 2, there is
Lmax1 (X → Y1, Y2)
=I(X ;Y1) + I(X ;Y2|Y1)
≤I(X ;Y1) + I(X ;Y2)
=Lmax1 (X → Y1) + L
max
1 (X → Y2).
(65a)
(65b)
(65c)
For α =∞, we also have
Lmax∞ (X → Y1, Y2)
= log
∑
y1,y2∈Y1×Y2
max
x∈X
P (y1|x)P (y2|x)
≤ log
∑
y1,y2∈Y1×Y2
(
max
x∈X
P (y1|x)
)(
max
x∈X
P (y2|x)
)
= log
∑
y1∈Y1
max
x∈X
P (y1|x) + log
∑
y2∈Y2
max
x∈X
P (y2|x)
=Lmax∞ (X → Y1) + L
max
∞ (X → Y2).
(66a)
(66b)
(66c)
(66d)
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